Introduction: Hybrid Security Governance in Africa by Bagayoko, Niagalé
The rise of the security sector reform (SSR)
concept has recognised and renewed the
importance of security forces in democratisation
processes and paved the way for a civilianisation
of security provision in African states (OECD
2007). Security reform has increasingly been
seen by international actors as a major area of,
and been presented as, a central matter of
democracy with security forces being considered
as meant to be dedicated to promoting and
defending the rule of law and, ultimately, the
degree to which political and human rights can
be enjoyed equally by all citizens. Transforming
such forces into rights-respecting services that
provide protection both to the state and to
citizens has been one of the most complex
challenges, particularly in post-conflict situations
where security forces have often perpetuated
serious human rights violations. 
Since the last decade, many African governments
have introduced security restructuring
programmes, frequently under pressure from the
international community. However, such policies
have in most cases encountered mitigated or
limited success when they have not completely
failed. In fact, there is a missing link in SSR
policies: the specific circumstances of African
states have hardly been recognised. SSR reform
programmes as generally promoted by
international actors have not sufficiently
acknowledged the fact that in Africa, security
governance is based on a complex amalgam of
statutory and non-statutory actors and
institutions which form the security sector.
Indeed, SSR processes are more often than not
focused on structural and formal institutional
arrangements of the state. International donors
often tend to view SSR as a purely technico-
institutional reform, using techniques of
organisational engineering and principles of
institutional design. Too often, security reform
processes supported by external donors tend to
be driven by an administrative view of the state
which emphasises its legal structure whilst
glossing over its political and social character.
Consequently, international actors too often
recommend applying technocratic practices
geared at building security capabilities meant to
deliver Western-style policing. 
Whilst promoting a legal-rational approach to
SSR, most external actors tend not to be aware
of, minimise or in some cases ignore the
importance of informal norms and processes
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Africa. Yet, there is a dire need today to take a
critical stance on the relationships between the
various systems, actors and beneficiaries involved
in the security sector on the African continent.
This IDS Bulletin precisely aims to focus on both
formal and informal governance mechanisms1
which do characterise African security systems.
Most of the contributions identify informal
networks and processes which, alongside legally
established structures, influence decision-
making processes as well as policy
implementation: they provide an analysis of the
interactions between such informal networks and
processes on the one hand, and formal ones at
the local, national or international level. 
The articles gathered here are based on desk and
field research, conducted within the framework of
the ‘Global Uncertainties: Security in an Africa of
Networked, Multilevel Governance’2 programme,
which has been investigating the ways in which
African security governance is reshaped by the
interactions of the heterogeneous norms,
standards and procedures promoted by local,
national and international actors. This
programme has been built on the observation
that security governance in Africa is multilevelled
and networked – from the village to the
international organisation, and well beyond what
is specified in formal government structures. The
focus has not only been on the ways in which key
conflict-management institutions evolve
themselves but also on the changing ways in
which the networks they are embedded in
actually operate as they try to rebuild governance
in security-challenged societies. 
The articles in this IDS Bulletin specifically
address the current state of the security sector in
African countries, referring to the analytic models
of ‘hybridity’ to grasp the current realities and the
prospects for change in security-related policies. 
1 Hybrid security orders
A number of scholars have proposed to analyse
and understand political orders in the global
South using the concept of ‘hybridity’. This
concept is generally promoted to offer an
alternative to a concept such as ‘fragile’ states
but also – and more interestingly as far as the
topic addressed in this issue is concerned – to the
legal-rational approach which underlies most of
the public policies promoted by international
donors and policymakers, particularly in peace
building processes.
Focusing primarily on state formation in South
Pacific and Southeast Asian countries like Papua
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and
East Timor, Volker Boege has thoroughly studied
the interpenetrations of different social spheres
and the subsequent interactions between the
formal state apparatus on the one hand, and
informal institutions on the other hand, leading
to the emergence of hybrid political orders. In
most developing countries, ‘These hybrid orders
are characterized by a plurality of overlapping
rule systems which has a profound effect on
politics and policies in these societies’ (Institute
for Development and Peace 2008). Boege’s
analysis refers to the Weberian distinction
between three different kinds of legitimacy,
based on:
z firstly, legal authority which refers to rational
grounds – ‘resting on a belief in the “legality”’
of patterns of normative rules and the right of
those elevated to authority under such rules to
issue commands; 
z secondly, traditional authority referring to
traditional grounds – resting on an
established belief in the sanctity of
immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of
the status of those exercising authority under
them;
z thirdly, charismatic authority referring to
charismatic grounds – resting on devotion to
the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism
or exemplary character of an individual
person, and of the normative patterns or order
revealed or ordained by him.
Boege considers that Weberian legal-rational
legitimacy has been overemphasised in Southern
countries, and suggests we also need to explore
the significance of different types and sources of
legitimacy, including traditional and charismatic
as well as hybrid forms of legitimacy. He focuses
on non-Western local approaches to conflict
transformation (non-state customary institutions,
mechanisms and actors) and on the interface of
local and liberal Western approaches to peace
building (Boege 2006; Boege et al. 2008, 2009). 
Similarly, Tobias Debiel and Daniel Lambach
have also investigated the concept of ‘hybrid
political orders’, which they view as a regular
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feature of social and political life in many
Southern countries (Debiel and Lambach 2009).
As they state on their research programme page,
Hybrid Political Orders in Fragile Environments, ‘Far
from being cultural remnants as orthodox state-
building approaches portray them, hybrid
political orders are vibrant mechanisms of
governance’. Their research programme analyses
the interaction between the hybrid institutions
and donor actors in development cooperation.
At present, very little is known about these
hybrid orders, which can hardly be captured in
all their dimensions. As stated by the
Governance and Social Development Resource
Centre (GSDRC), 
Donors have tended to focus on formal
political institutions and structures. Although
these are important, it is essential to
recognize that much political activity takes
place according to informal norms and
systems in developing countries. Whilst
formal political systems are generally publicly
announced, for example in laws, regulations
and codes, informal systems are embedded in
socio-cultural institutions, norms and
standards. (…) The relative influence of
formal and informal political systems in local
and national politics is a critical debate. The
literature has tended to presume a clear
dichotomy between formal and informal,
traditional and modern, and democratic and
non-democratic political systems. But in
reality, these distinctions are not so clear, and
formal and informal systems overlap and
interrelate’ (Scott and Mcloughlin 2012: 11). 
Focusing specifically on the security sector
enables one to get a sense of the interactions at
stake and to answer the following questions:
z How do hybrid political orders influence
security reform processes?
z How do hybrid orders relate to external actors?
To answer those questions, it is relevant to refer
to a neo-institutionalism theoretical framework,
which defines institutions as the set of formal
and informal rules, customs, habits and routines
by which decisions are made concerning the
distribution of power and the organisation of a
given society. As stated by Vivien A. Schmidt
(2006: 3), whilst 
rational choice institutionalism focuses on
rational actors pursuing their interests and
following their preferences within political
institutions, defined as structures of
incentives, according to a ‘logic of calculation’
[h]istorical institutionalism concentrates
instead on the history of political institutions
and their constituent parts, which have their
origins in the (often unintended) outcomes of
purposeful choices and historically unique
initial conditions, and which develop over time
following a ‘logic of path-dependence’.
Sociological institutionalism sees political
institutions as socially constituted and
culturally framed, with political agents acting
according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that
follows from culturally-specific rules and norms. 
As stated by March and Olsen (2004), the ‘logic of
appropriateness’ is a perspective that sees human
action as driven by rules of appropriate behaviour,
organised into institutions: rules can be defined as
‘routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies,
organizational forms, and technologies around
which political activity is constructed’ but they
also refer to the ‘beliefs, paradigms, codes,
cultures, and knowledge that surround, support,
elaborate, and contradict those roles and routines’
(March and Olsen 1989: 17). 
Both historical and sociological institutionalism
believe that decision-making processes are not
exclusively nested in formal institutions which can
be defined as formal structures corresponding to
the institutional, organisational and bureaucratic
structures derived from the constitutional
architecture which was set up (and perpetuated)
after Independence, such as constitutions, laws,
decrees, as well as legally-established
administrative structures such as ministries,
legislature, rule of law institutions, political
parties, and so on (Chabal 2007). According to
historical and sociological institutionalism, a
wider variety of institutions operate alongside or
within formal political institutions and are at play
in decision-making processes and public policies,
most of which are informal in essence. As shown
by Hyden, ‘sociological and historical
institutionalists consider that institutions have a
life of their own shaping agency through
socialization over time. Informal institutions,
however, do not preclude a form of rationality’
(2006: 5). Informal systems are based on implicit
rules and unwritten understandings. They reflect
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sociocultural routines and norms as well as
underlying patterns of interactions among
socioeconomic classes (for instance caste systems)
and communities (different ethnic groups).
According to Hyden (2006: 10), the essence of
these informal institutions can be summarised in
the following points: (1) actors share a common
set of expectations, (2) they rely on simple forms
of reciprocity, (3) rules are unwritten but
understood by each actor, (4) exchanges are non-
contractual and non-specified in terms of time,
(5) they are being implemented confidentially
and with no particular attention to detailed
objectives or methods, and (6) they rely on self-
enforcement in case of a breach of the perceived
agreement.
How informal institutions differ from formal
ones is summarised in Table 1.
Such a comparison is relevant to the kind of
analyses developed in this issue, even if they
differ from it on an important point: the
different articles do consider that exchanges in
African polities are definitely contractual, in the
sense that they persist across time and have a
strong element of obligation. They are in
accordance with Eric Scheye in considering that
‘The relationships between the state and non-
state networks is between polities, one that ebbs
and flows based upon the circulation and
dynamics of balances of power. Furthermore, the
relationships between and among the differing
layers of authority is an integral part of the
social contract that establishes the state’ (Scheye
2009: 7). Social exchanges embedded in informal
institutions are also contractual in essence but it
is the basis of the contract which differs.3
The different articles of this IDS Bulletin insist
on the mutual processes and on the continuing
transformation at stake, assuming that the states
and the informal networks are not mutually
exclusive. On the contrary, in Africa, the state
and the informal networks have to be seen as
embedded one into the other. 
2 Informalisation, deviation and
instrumentalisation of legally-established
security structures
‘While government institutions are important,
the state qualities of governance – that is, being
able to define and enforce collectively binding
decisions on members of society – are not
exclusively nested in these institutions. A wider
variety of institutions are at play in this
enterprise’ (Lund 2006: 685). Most of the articles
of this IDS Bulletin specifically focus on customary
and social practices which are embedded into
state structures and decision-making processes.
Indeed, studying security reform processes shows
that within the institutional frameworks legally
established, informal societal institutions and
practices follow their own logic and rules
deviating the state from its Weberian ideal-type.
State structures – which most of the time have
been inspired by the legal-rational form of the
Western state – are informed and in fact modified
by the incorporation of indigenous norms and
social practices. 
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Table 1 Comparison of formal and informal institutions
Variable Formal institutions Informal institutions
Type of exchange Impersonal Face-to-face
Approach to rules Rule of law Rules in use
Character of rules Written Unwritten
Nature of exchange Contractual Non-contractual 
Time schedule Specified Non-specified
Actor premise Organizational goal adherence Shared expectations
Implications of agreement Precise compliance Ambiguous execution
Transparency Potentially open to scrutiny Closed and confidential
Conflict resolution Third party body Self-enforcement
Source Hyden (2006).
Their approach is inspired by the historical
institutionalism,4 which puts the stress on ‘path
dependencies’: to understand current security
governance in African countries, the articles
show how useful it can be to examine the
historical trajectory of the police sector. They
emphasise the importance of the colonial legacy
on the (authoritarian) way in which the security
sector has been governed since Independence.
Indeed, in many African countries, the nature
and character of the security forces have been
deeply affected by the autocratic nature of the
colonial state, as also shown by Anderson and
Killingray (1991 and 1992), even if such colonial
forces can be remembered in the popular
memory as highly respected and professional
ones. Beyond the importance of the colonial
heritage, some articles stress the importance of
the legacy of the politicisation mechanisms
which were introduced after Independence, thus
challenging the neutrality of the security forces
and creating imbalances in its political
allegiance as well as in recruitment processes
and management procedures. 
Sociological institutionalism is also implicitly
referred to by some of the contributors, who
demonstrate that far from exclusively amounting
to formal institutional frameworks, institutions
generate an interpersonal trust that is more
immediate and exclusively reliant on unwritten
rules in use. ‘Informal institutions determine the
use of power and thus the distribution of goods is
politicised to favour those who are connected to
the government through ties of dependence with
political leaders’ (Hyden 2008: 32). The different
contributions refer to the ways in which
clientelistic and patronage networks are
penetrating the governance structures of the
formal state in order to promote their own
interests, often at the expense of public interests.
Our case studies show that Weberian-rationalist
institutions are used as resources to strengthen
solidarities with, and networks affiliated to, the
ruling elite. They demonstrate that the
constitutional and legal resources offered by the
formal framework of the African state are used by
political leaders to shape political decisions on
the basis of mutual gains with the members of
their ethnic and family networks. It is in this way
that the analyses developed in this issue slightly
differ from most neo-patrimonialist theories.
Whilst such approaches generally consider that
Western-style formal institutions are weak in
essence and are to a large extent in contradiction
with the informal systems of power, all the
articles demonstrate that, on the contrary, the
informal systems of power are in fact
complementary to the legally-established
frameworks: both formal and informal
institutions are seen as functional by the politico-
administrative elites and are mobilised in order
to legitimise their power and authority,
particularly in the security sector. Some of them
insist on the fact that presidential leadership in
the security sector – as acknowledged and
promoted by the Constitution – is structured
around particularistic, personalised, networks,
which are embedded into formal institutions and
legislations. Those articles also insist on the
processes of appropriation of state institutions
and on the penetration of formal state structures
by some groups, stressing the efforts made by
ruling elites to adjust to and manipulate the
legal-rational arrangements to make them
congruent with their interest. So, the relationship
between formal and informal institutions is
mutually reinforcing and in fact, there is an
integration of the formal and informal spheres.
Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) had already
shown that informal systems of powers (such as
patrimonialism and clientelism) and formal
political systems (including processes such as
liberalisation, democratisation, decentralisation
and civil service reform) are not isolated from
each other or society at large: according to them,
informal systems are based on existing patterns
of power, and they can adapt to the development
of formal institutions and coexist with them. As
advocated by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002:
35), there is a need for a ‘more detailed
understanding of the embeddedness of social
relations and state-society interaction patterns’
and for a ‘recognition that there are functional
aspects to these relations and patterns’. That is
what this IDS Bulletin intends to provide. 
The legal framework is not the only one at stake:
formal procedures are also subject to deviation.
For instance, most of the security reform
programmes aim to ensure fair, balanced and
equitable recruitment, putting the focus on the
transformation of the composition of the
institution with regards to its social, ethnic,
regional and gender composition, and its human
resource practices, in order to promote the
emergence of a less-corrupted and more
professional body of security officers. However,
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criteria for recruitment and promotion within
the security forces are still characterised by a
high degree of opaqueness, and privileges and
promotion are more often than not allocated on
a subjective basis: even in countries where there
is no exclusive ethnic-based policy, ethnic
affiliations and regional ties still do matter more
than professionalism and in the absence of
formalised institutional contracts, citizens rely
on informal social contracts to progress in life. 
It is also worth noting that formal and informal
governance systems are not necessarily feeding
each other in a democratic way: the formal
institutional framework modelled on Western
institutions is not automatically conducive to
democratic security governance and, for
instance, the institutional, organisational and
bureaucratic structures which derive from the
constitutional architecture set up after
Independence and inherited (particularly from
the French model) can easily pave the way to
undemocratic practices. Furthermore, formal
institutions of democratic security governance
can fuel the informal practices of exploitation5 in
the sense that formal, legal structures are often
used by political elites as a means of informal
exploitation of the less educated, who generally
do not have the knowledge or resources to
employ the formal legal structures to defend
themselves. Consequently, formal legality
becomes a resource employed only by the elites
to advance their own interests. Under such
conditions, security sector reform – which is
clearly an attempt at reforming and
transforming governance and power distribution
in security systems by democratising them – can
be a highly controversial endeavour likely to
involve political conflict: powerful political
interests are at stake in security sector reform
because such a process – which features efforts
to reverse the neo-patrimonial state by
introducing more human security-centred
governance – can threaten the existing
distribution of power. Indigenous informal
solidarities embedded into state structures, often
based on kinship or ethnic solidarities, can 
become the subject of power struggles
between competing social groups and their
leaders, and are utilised by those groups and
leaders for their own benefit, regardless of the
needs of the ‘nation’ or the ‘citizenry’. In a
way, the whole debate about neo-
patrimonialism, clientelistic networks and
patronage (…) revolves around this
usurpation of imported formal governance
structures by indigenous informal societal
forces’ (Boege et al. 2009). 
Finally, this IDS Bulletin seeks to capture the role
of political elites in the development of formal
and informal security policies and the ways in
which they influence the exercise of policing,
power and representation at the local level. The
most powerful political factions ensure that the
administrative/bureaucratic apparatus operates
in a way compatible with the requirements of the
informal political order, which is a good
illustration of Chabal’s statement according to
which, ‘the success of the State [is] measured
domestically, by both rulers and ruled, in terms
of how well it performed according to the criteria
relevant to the workings of the informal political
sphere’ (Chabal 2007). This IDS Bulletin is thus
an invitation to pay attention to ‘socially
embedded forms of reciprocity’ (Hyden 2006: 1).
It shows that, even at the grassroots level, the
traditional social obligations often are much
more powerful than obligations as a ‘citizen’ or
as a civil servant. In some cases, reform-minded
national and international officers have to
handle carefully the role of traditional
authorities, particularly to take into account the
influence of the powerful secret societies (such as
the Bondo society) seen as ‘guardians of culture
as of community’ (See Charley and M’Cormack,
this IDS Bulletin); this requires a certain amount
of knowledge of and familiarity with local
customs and traditional authorities. 
3 Security from below: the role of traditional
actors
A growing number of security challenges are no
longer confined to national borders, including:
terrorism; drug, human beings and small arms
trafficking; smuggling; plundering of natural
resources; and illegal migrations. African states
are all confronted by the same criminal
transnational threats. The very classical
responses mobilised by the state are not sufficient
to address criminality. Today, some regions, in
particular the Sahelian region is in fact
experiencing a shift from conflict to
transnational criminality. The distinction
between external security on the one hand –
identified by a concern with mainly military
threats coming from the aggressive behaviour of
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other states (and usually captured by strategic
studies) and, on the other hand, internal security
– identified as criminal, or otherwise disturbing
activities, within the boundaries of a state (and
traditionally captured by criminology or justice
studies), has been increasingly blurred. This
implies that both crime and war have tended to
meet and, consequently, the role of the military
and the police forces have increasingly coincided.
The emergence of a growing number of
transnational risks and threats challenge the
traditional distinction between internal and
external security in states ill-equipped to address
them. Not being in a position to secure its
borders and to mobilise significant human or
economic resources, the African state proves
unable to cope with transnational criminality. In
this context, the role of informal security actors –
tied into networks of social relations and a web of
mutual obligations – is increasingly important on
the continent. Informal security in Africa is both
embedded into economic (unequal development)
and cultural (customs and traditions) structures.
Although most African states claim authority
within the boundaries of their internationally
recognised territory, non-state institutions of
governance which used to exist prior to the era of
colonial rule have survived in large parts of that
territory. In an important number of African
countries, the state has proved unable to succeed
in the centralisation and monopolisation of
security. In much of Africa, there 
has hardly [been]… any point in time [when
the state] had a monopoly of legitimate
force… [The] security sector has… typically
manifested both formal and informal tracks.
Even in states which are ostensibly stable,
statutory institutions have been unable to
provide security to all categories of its citizens
at affordable levels, with supplementary roles
being played by an array of traditional security
actors… The Westphalian assumption that
monopoly over the means of legitimate
coercion lies with the state and its institutions
meets a veritable challenge in the face of the
wide support and legitimacy enjoyed by non-
state security institutions’ (Ebo 2007: 10–11). 
Such non-state institutions can be described as
customary societal structures (extended families,
clans, tribes, religious brotherhoods) and
traditional authorities (village elders, religious
leaders, headmen, clan chiefs, healers). Their
influence is particularly important in rural and
remote peripheral areas. As shown by Eric
Scheye (2009: 5), 
the post-colonial state is defined by the rule of
the ‘intermediaries’, a series of networks and
polities that substitute and compensate for the
lack of authority of the central, legally
constituted state and its ability to deliver
essential public goods and services. In the post-
colonial state, state agencies are not the
primary vehicles for the distribution of public
goods and services. Non-state systems and
institutions which, together, effectively
function as a ‘second state’ assume that role
and function and they provide the
preponderance of all public goods and services.
This IDS Bulletin shows how the traditional
security providers are often seen by local
communities as more effective and efficient than
the state’s ones but also as much more
legitimate. Official procedures enforced by the
states are often seen as hardly understandable or
accessible. The way in which traditional security
providers deliver security is congruent with
norms and historical legacies of communities
and populations who rely on their services. Our
publication is in compliance with the burgeoning
literature relating to such non-state security
actors, which, if not prolific has been rich over
the last few years (Kassimir 2001; Keulder 1998;
Ayoade and Agbaje 1989; Jorgël and Utas 2007;
Heald 2007).6 Bruce Baker has emphasised
particularly well the importance of informal
policing on the continent (Baker 2004a, b and
2008). Baker defines policing as ‘any organised
activity that seeks to ensure the maintenance of
communal order, security and peace through
elements of prevention, deterrence, investigation
of breaches, and punishments. It is in fact a
mechanism of governance. As such, it can be
authorised and provided by non-state groups as
well as the state’ (Baker 2004b: 165). In Africa,
there is an increasing diversification of policing
away from state to non-state policing agencies:
Baker seeks to understand the variety of policing
existing in Africa. Illustrating Baker’s concept of
‘multi-choice policing’, this IDS Bulletin puts the
stress on an important number of policing
agencies which are offering localised protection
of different levels of legality, effectiveness,
availability, methods and service, showing that
African populations are confronted with a
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multiple-choice of private and public, legal and
illegal, formal and informal policing (see also
Baker and Scheye 2007). 
4 Re-formation and reinvention of customary
practices
It would be misleading, however, to see traditional
and customary practices as unchangeable and
static: far from frozen in past practices, the
intervention of traditional and customary actors
are in fact subject to re-formation and reinvention. 
Firstly, the role of customary and traditional
networks might be blurred more often than not.
Indeed, criminal networks involved in drug
trafficking, terrorist activism, etc. are in some
cases embedded in traditional societal structures
and tied back to kinship-based entities and
common localities of origin.7 There is sometimes
a convergence of interests between criminal
networks and local communities. 
Secondly, most criminal activities in Africa –
particularly in the Sahel – are not local in
essence but are connected to regional and global
criminal networks.8 As shown by Boege et al. the 
combinations of forces from the customary
sphere – like chiefs, traditional kings, religious
authorities and their constituencies – and from
the sphere of (…) new formations – like
warlords and their militias, ethnic or
millenarian movements or rackets of organised
crime. The new formations are often linked to
traditional societal entities and attempt to
instrumentalise these for their own new goals,
such as power and profit’ (Boege et al. 2008: 9). 
Via drug trafficking and terrorism, locally
embedded orders link into the globalised market
and global society. Criminal actors such as
terrorist or drug traffickers can also provide
protection, welfare services or sources of incomes
to local communities.
Thirdly, there is a need to locate the informal
security sector within the discourses of equitable
security governance: there is a linkage between
poverty and the role of traditional and customary
communities in security. Scharf and Nina (2001)
have rightly assumed that when the state does
not adequately protect the poor, they tend to rely
on informal security providers. This IDS Bulletin
is in fact on the same page as Comfort Ero
(2000: 26), who sees vigilantes and local militias
– such as the Kamajors (civil defence forces) of
Sierra Leone – as cheap, community-based
elements in search of security outside formal
state structures. 
Fourthly, customary processes and structures are
subject to ‘reinvention’. Traditional and
customary institutions are undoubtedly showing
a strong resilience; nevertheless they are subject
to important changes and are exposed to
external influences, being penetrated and
informed both by the central state apparatus and
by international norms. Increasingly, the states
as well as the international actors are trying to
incorporate traditional security mechanisms into
their own strategies. New practices, not strictly
customary but rooted in customs, are emerging:
customary conflict management mechanisms can
be combined with foreign as well as with state-
centric approaches. A number of states have thus
managed to control most of the informal and
non-statutory groups, for instance, in Uganda, in
Niger or in Togo (Hassane Boubacar 2010).
Malian national authorities have also been trying
to incorporate the role of traditional and customs
mechanisms, even if less formally than in other
African countries. It is also important to mention
the fact that a number of international actors,
notably the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the
UK Department for International Development
(DFID), are presently paying growing attention
to the role of non-state/local actors. Indeed,
some international donors are increasingly
interested in customs and traditional
mechanisms. DFID, in 2004, recognised the
importance of non-state/local justice and security
networks. The OECD followed suit in 2007 with
an analysis of justice and security service delivery
in fragile states: 
The OECD has itself recognized the vitality of
non-state/local justice and security networks,
stating that ‘a growing interest in and
willingness to work with local institutions of
governance – such as shuras in Afghanistan –
is also welcome. Traditional systems, which
may not be recognisable in western states, may
still perform the same functions and generate
the same outputs as formal state institutions.
Respect and willingness to accommodate such
systems […] can be helpful in restoring
governance’ (OECD-DAC 2008: 36). 
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New networks, which are coming along on top of
the traditional ones, are presently emerging. The
‘alternative security concept’ – which has been
promoted in Northern Mali – is a telling
example of the ‘processes of assimilation,
articulation, transformation and/or adoption in
the context of the global/exogenous –
local/indigenous interface’ (Boege et al. 2008: 7).
This alternative security concept promoted by
both international donors and traditional
authorities is giving a sense of the process of
syncretism between international norms and
local conflict mechanisms at stake in security
sector reform processes in Southern countries.
The concept of ‘alternative security’ can clearly
be seen as a combination of the two ideal types of
community policing9 which have been identified
by Wisler and Ihekwoaba:
Community policing ‘Western style’ is
described as a top-down approach of security,
with a [sic] police taking the lead in
mobilizing community self-rule in policing
matters. In many places in the world, but
perhaps more researched and visible in Africa
than elsewhere, community policing follows
rather a bottom-up approach with
communities initiating and practicing a great
deal of informal, unofficial policing negotiated
more or less successfully with the state. The
first type, we argue, is a historical product of
the Western nation state after the successful
integration of peripheries and the
development of a modern bureaucracy, while
the second type is more likely in states with a
weaker bureaucracy and a tradition of legal
pluralism. In the latter context, rural and
urban social movements alike might find in
the tool box of culture robust informal
policing practices to reproduce order and
benefit from the support of powerful political
allies (Wisler and Ihekwoaba 2007: 1). 
The case studies of this IDS Bulletin present such
a syncretism. The introduction of a community
policing approach, heavily influenced and
informed by the Western approach to the
concept, has been promoted in most of the SSR
processes studied here. However, the different
environments have required different types of
community engagement, involving traditional
figures of authority as well as Civil Defence
Forces, which had maintained law and order
during recent wars. Traditional policing actors
have not only provided their support to the
reinstalment of the state security forces at the
local level but also have cooperated with them
and even been entrusted a number of duties
(administration of civil justice in non-criminal
cases; detention of prisoners in their own
custodies once those have been prosecuted
according to the law) (see Charley and
M’Cormack, this IDS Bulletin). 
5 What is the research telling us?
The contributions to this IDS Bulletin illustrate
how the researchers involved in the Global
Uncertainties Programme have arrived at the
conclusions mentioned above. The first article
situates security sector reform processes within
the general framework of the African Peace and
Security Architecture (APSA) which is presently
being set up at the continental level. Olaf
Bachmann’s article shows that the African Union
and African states are severely dependent on
external support for security sector capacity-
building as well as for operations. His article
outlines the threats that the African Standby
Force (ASF) is confronted with, due to the lack of
political, conceptual, and financial ownership on
the side of the recipients, who are also its main
stakeholders. The result is at best an ambiguous
partnership between donors and African
stakeholders. 
The second article of this issue proposes a
methodology to capture empirically hybrid
security orders. Niagalé Bagayoko suggests that
the multilevel governance approach can provide
a relevant framework to study the way in which
domestic security governance in African
countries is reshaped by the interactions of the
heterogeneous norms, standards and procedures
underlying international and domestic policing
processes. This article advocates an approach
which consists of expanding the agenda of the
traditional multilevel governance approach
(mainly focused on the European Union) in
order to capture the sets of actors and
procedures which have driven the security
reform process in the Central African Republic.
Mapping out the various levels of government at
which decisions are made, this article seeks to
capture the intermingling of domestic and
international decision-making processes which
increasingly overlap and interfere with each
other in Southern countries.
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Thierry Nlandu Mayamba maps out and
examines the roles and responsibilities of the
various formal institutions and stakeholders
involved in the management of the police forces
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). All
security services in the DRC possess a legal
framework within which they must operate.
However, his article shows that the security and
police sector stakeholders in the DRC are linked
together in a web of complex and dynamic
systems, characterised by discrepancies between
theory and practice. Far from working either in
opposition to one another or in parallel, these
systems intertwine more than they conflict, and
there are significant overlaps and confusion with
regard to the mandates of the existing
institutions, structures and actors involved. The
legal contradictions and loopholes identified in
this article are often the result of dubious
interpretations, or even deliberate
misinterpretations of existing operational
provisions underlying the functioning of security
services.
Joseph P. Chris Charley and Freida Ibiduni
M’Cormack consider the way in which police
reform has been conducted in Sierra Leone. They
present the historical, institutional and political
environment of the Sierra Leonean police since
the era of British colonial rule to the late 2000s.
The changes which occurred during and since the
1990s civil war, as well as the pivotal role played by
a generation of reform-minded officers and by a
British inspector of police, are paid particular
attention. The constraints faced by the reform
agenda and the tactics which were used to address
them – especially those aimed at mobilising
traditional actors or customs – are then analysed. 
In another contribution, Niagalé Bagayoko
highlights the specificities which have to be taken
into account when enacting a Security Sector
Reform process in environments with different
traditions and backgrounds. This article maps out
and analyses how security institutions work in
Francophone and Anglophone African countries
and how the different actors (security providers
as well as oversight actors) relate to each other.
The issue at stake is to highlight the kind of
institutional framework prevailing in the two sets
of countries. 
Finally, Kalilou Sidibé investigates the way in
which Sahelian states address the intermingling
of terrorist and criminal activities and the way in
which they are overlapping with
communitarian/traditional conflict dynamics. A
particular focus is the situation in Northern
Mali, which is facing a combination of three
major security issues: the increasing presence of
Islamist terrorist groups, especially Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); the expansion of
criminal networks (both international and
domestic) and the recurrent Tuareg rebellion.
The issue at stake in this article is to identify
how Malian authorities are coping with those
threats, taking into account both local dynamics
(particularly the relations between the criminal
groups and the local populations in the north)
and international policies (particularly those
emanating from the United States, France and
the European Union). 
All the articles reaffirm the importance of
conducting any analysis of African security
governance at multiple levels. They all converge
to state that even when central security forces
exist, these are weakly controlled from the
centre as they often depend on local predation
for their subsistence. In all the contributions,
networks are also seen as central in explaining
how all the different levels function: the central
organisations are managed informally on the
basis of ethnic networks, and most of the articles
highlight the continuing importance of ethnicity
in the legitimation of authority; that traditional
authorities and informal local security systems
depend on more localised versions of these same
networks for their resources; and international
actors also have networks, their value-systems
being at cross purposes to both the centre and
traditional/local.
Finally, the key question raised by this IDS
Bulletin is whether or not the concept of
‘hybridity’ can be more than an analytical one
and become a guide for action. Indeed, it can be
argued that ‘hybridity’ in its broadest sense could
be a strategy for building effective security
systems at this stage of African state
development. The articles gathered here suggest
that ‘hybridity’ can be seen as an efficient and
effective method of providing security, not just as
an analytical tool for explaining dysfunctions in
the security systems. Implicitly, the authors draw
the hypothesis that it might be stimulating to
consider some networks as valuable checks and
balances whose mobilisation can contribute to
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African security order. As Boege et al. (2008: 16)
state, there is a need for 
de-emphasizing weakness, fragility, failure
and collapse, and focusing on hybridity,
generative processes, innovative adaptation
and ingenuity. This also entails perceiving
community resilience and customary
institutions not so much as spoilers and
problems, but as assets and sources of
solutions that can be drawn upon in order to
forge constructive relationships between
communities and governments, and between
customary and introduced political and social
institutions. 
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Notes
1 In this article, the word ‘formal’ refers to
codified institutions and the word ‘informal’
refers to non-codified institutions. 
2 Since 2009, the ‘Global Uncertainties
Programme’, led by the Institute of
Development Studies (Sussex) under the lead
of Professor David K. Leonard, has been
financed by the Research Councils of the UK.
3 As shown by David K. Leonard, the historical
and foundational social contract for most
Africans is not between the state and
individuals – as assumed by the classical social
contract theorists, which most of the
international community refers to –but is
instead with communities. Cf. Volume 2 of this
IDS Bulletin edited by Professor David K.
Leonard (Issue 44 No 1, forthcoming January
2013). Furthermore, Leonard concludes that
some of these exchanges are ‘contractual’ but
that others are simply ‘bargains’, that is they
are agreements which last only as long as they
are mutually beneficial and have less
obligation. 
4 Such an approach has been adopted by
Emmanuel Kwesi Aning who has thoroughly
analysed the endemic process of militarisation
which used to characterise the Ghanaian
police service from 1960 to 1980 (Aning 2004,
2006). 
5 The conclusions of this IDS Bulletin are in fact
very similar to the conclusions of Alice Hills
(1996) who has offered a thorough analysis of
police forces in African countries by
examining the nature, functions and
capabilities of African police forces as well as
an analysis of public order under various
governments and police systems. Exploring
the impact of steps toward liberalisation of
policing systems in 1990 in Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Namibia, Somalia, Uganda and Zaïre, Hills
(2000) has emphasised the irrelevance of an
analysis assessing African police forces in
terms of their adherence to democratic
criteria: according to her (2007), the police
are in fact governed according to presidential
preferences because of the relationships
between Presidents and their chief police
officers (Commissioners or Inspectors
General). Under such circumstances, public
accountability is in fact playing a negligible
role. In this way, Hills herself confirms the
continuing relevance of Potholm’s (1969: 142)
observation according to which the police
enforce decisions taken by political
authorities. 
6 Heald (2007) has focused on the development
and history of sungusunu organisations in
Kenya. Sungusunu have developed out of an
indigenous organisation to control theft and
particularly cattle raiding, and operate under
the authority of the district administration:
norms of crime, trial and punishment distinct
from those enforced by the national penal
code have been developed. Distancing
themselves from the police and the judiciary,
the sungusunu have had far-reaching effects on
security at the local level.
7 In the second volume of this IDS Bulletin,
Professor David K. Leonard will show how
Somalian warlord systems are embedded in
the local societal structure of clans and tribes
(Issue 44 No 1, forthcoming January 2013).
8 Such as the example of drug trafficking from
Latin America, which is increasingly
transiting via the Guinea Gulf, particularly
via Guinea Bissau, before penetrating the
European market. 
9 For a donor-driven approach of community
policing, see Groenwald and Peake (2004).
According to those authors, a community-
based approach of policing is not only meant
to deal with crime but to address citizens’
security concerns. 
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